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This  paper  represents  a  continuation  of  a  previous  paper
1  where  we 
demonstrated the “abnormal” behavior that local authority from Romania is 
manifesting regarding the subventions received from the central budget. 
The outstanding representatives of the American School of Public Choice, 
James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock or Geoffrey Brennan, argue that at the 
base of establishing allocation criteria of the transfers are not only social 
and economic criteria, but also pure political factors. According to this, the 
                                                 
1 Talpos Ioan, Mutascu Mihai, Dudas Doru, Transferurile bugetare versus autonomia financiara locala - 
cazul  Romaniei,  Sesiunea  de  comunicari  stiintifice  cu  participare  internationala,  Lumea  financiara  - 
prezent si perspective, Cluj-Napoca, 2003.   2 
budgetary transfers given to the local authorities can represent some true 
“rewards” for the communities that have sustained, are sustaining or will 
sustain the political demarche of the forces that have the power. 
 
If we suppose that there is a relation between the transfers given by the 
central  to  the  local  authorities  and  the  political  sphere,  a  challenging 
question arises: how we can identify, characterize and quantified a linkage 
like this. In Romania’s case it has been noticed that in the period before the 
elections,  the  fiscal  policies  were  accompanied  by  several  important 
changes at the level of repartition of public funds, by the reduction of the 
fiscal and growths of the public charges, especially of those whit a social 
character. 
 
In  accord  with  public  choice  theory,  we  can  suppose  that  there  is  an 
“affinity” of a social group - local communities in this case - for a certain 
political  party  or  political  coalition,  in  which  case  can  expect  that  the 
distribution of public funds, having the nature of transfers given by the 
central  budget  to  local  budgets,  to  be  impregnated  with  a  considerable 
“political color”. 
   
This paper is trying to establish, in Romania, quantitative and qualitative, 
the  modality  of  distributing the central public funds to local authorities 
under  the  political  impact.  For  determining  the  “affinity”  of  a  local 
community for the political party or political coalition that holds the power, 
we propose the construction of an “index of proximity to power”, obtained 
on the base of number of votes received by that party in a local community. 
 
The index takes this shape: 
 
 votes of number      Total
votes     favorable   of Number   I =                        (1) 
where: 
- “Number of favorable votes” represents the number of favorable votes 
obtained in the local community chosen by the party or coalition that holds 
the power 
-  “Total  number  of  votes”  represents  the  total  number  of  votes,  valid 
expressed in that local community. 
   3 
We can notice that the index takes values between 0 and 1. If the index 
value is 1, we can conclude that there’s a maxim affinity, and if the index is 
0, we have a null affinity. So, the proximity to power is greater if it is closer 
to 1. 
 
In Romania’s case, there have been picked and treated two annual statistical 
series, on the interval between 1993 and 2002, corresponding to the eight 
regions of development (R1 - North - east, R2 / South - east, R3 - South, R4 
- South - west, R5 - West, R6 - North - west, R7 - Center, R8 - Bucharest), 
representing the “index of proximity to power” (I), and the level of local 
transfers (T). 
 
To establish the level of the “index of proximity to power” we used the 
results of the Parliament elections from the 27
th of September 1992, the 3
rd 
of  November  1996  and  the  26
th  November  2000,  putting  accent  on  the 
percent  obtained,  at  the  level  of  each  county,  by  the  winning  party  in 
elections. Because the Parliament of Romania is bicameral, to obtain the 
final global value for the entire Parliament, we used an arithmetical average 
of the two indexes corresponding to the two chambers of the Parliament. 
 
Even if the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have slightly different 
attributions, so we can’t consider them equals from this point of view, we 
have used the arithmetical average for the index, because the majority of the 
people don’t notice the difference between the two chambers, and for them 
they  have  approximately  the  same  importance.  For  obtaining  statistical 
series, that can be correlated whit the regional level of subventions, we have 
gather  around  the  counties  from the eight regions of development from 
Romania, establishing for each region a value of the “index of proximity to 
power” as a arithmetical average of the values of the index corresponding to 
each county from the considered region. Further on, this value is considered 
to be constant for each of the four years afferent to the period.  
 
For the study of the linkage “local transfers- politic” we have chose the 
method of the econometrical analysis, conceiving a “Pool Date”
2 regressive 
model with this shape: 
 
                                                 
2 For econometric model we are use the econometric software Eviews 5.0.   4 
it it it ε βxX α Y + + =               (2) 
 
where Yit represents the dependent variable - T, α free term coefficient, β 
independent variable coefficient, Xit independent variable - I, εit error terms, 
i cross-sectional units observed for dated periods - 8 sections (the number of 
regions) and t the period of time (years 1993-2002). 
 
it it it ε βxI α T + + =           (3) 
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The obtained results after the modeling of the two statistical series are: 
 
Dependent Variable: T 
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR) 
Sample: 1993-2002 
Included observations: 10 
Cross-sections included: 8 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 80 
         
Variable  Coefficient  Standard 
Error  t-Statistic  Probability 
          R1--IR1  780.201,3  86.654,15  9,003623  0,0000 
R2--IR2  653.265,1  63.367,19  10,30920  0,0000 
R3--IR3  564.576,6  51.110,16  11,04627  0,0000 
R4--IR4  360774,6  32.884,71  10,97089  0,0000 
R5--IR5  660.308,9  44.404,04  14,87047  0,0000 
R6--IR6  1.061.351  99.477,19  10,66929  0,0000 
Ani/Regiune TR1 TR2 TR3 TR4 TR5 TR6 TR7 TR8 IR1 IR2 IR3 IR4 IR5 IR6 IR7 IR8
U.M
1993 36.705 37.336 27.930 26.015 31.444 29.467 31.152 108.191 0,428 0,395 0,413 0,408 0,267 0,159 0,139 0,280
1994 92.308 82.621 66.965 54.294 72.526 74.239 73.027 246.566 0,428 0,395 0,413 0,408 0,267 0,159 0,139 0,280
1995 150.636 129.498 118.326 90.842 110.857 121.644 111.976 366.108 0,428 0,395 0,413 0,408 0,267 0,159 0,139 0,280
1996 241.007 216.343 191.442 141.121 164.234 192.361 179.177 522.821 0,428 0,395 0,413 0,408 0,267 0,159 0,139 0,280
1997 486.865 432.320 370.403 266.710 338.953 376.887 387.143 1.130.953 0,286 0,342 0,332 0,324 0,347 0,293 0,229 0,472
1998 657.004 564.664 524.622 344.764 459.154 493.151 513.028 1.498.075 0,286 0,342 0,332 0,324 0,347 0,293 0,229 0,472
1999 353.632 248.204 139.787 81.916 158.975 205.543 192.880 183.089 0,286 0,342 0,332 0,324 0,347 0,293 0,229 0,472
2000 301.679 307.018 201.299 114.306 182.124 271.413 163.683 207.241 0,286 0,342 0,332 0,324 0,347 0,293 0,229 0,472
2001 813.690 569.979 560.719 340.639 494.307 612.893 454.533 507.668 0,527 0,463 0,493 0,527 0,387 0,248 0,234 0,401
2002 74.074 43.796 83.942 18.550 137.015 118.678 32.452 389.219 0,527 0,463 0,493 0,527 0,387 0,248 0,234 0,401
IRЄ(0,1) mld.ROL  5 
R7--IR7  1.073.400  80.597,71  13,31799  0,0000 
R8--IR8  1.425.994  172.479,6  8,267612  0,0000 
R-squared  0,926197  Mean dependent variable  0,801925 
Adjusted R-squared  0,919022  S.D. dependent variable  3,449420 
Standard Error  
of regression  0,981588      Sum squared residual  69,37308 
Durbin-Watson  1,961188 
   
In  the  supposed  case,  the  model  has  the  next  formal  and  general 
representation: 
 
TR1 = α1 x IR1             (4) 
TR2 = α2 x IR2             (5) 
TR3 = α3 x IR3             (6) 
TR4 = α4 x IR4             (7) 
TR5 = α5 x IR5       (8) 
TR6 = α6 x IR6       (9) 
 TR7 = α7 x IR7       (10) 
 TR8 = α8 x IR8       (11) 
 
As we can observe, the correlation coefficient shows the fact that 92,61% of 
the electors political orientation modifications redound on the level of local 
transfers, so we can conclude that the model is representative. 
 
TR1 = 780.201,3  x IR1             (12) 
TR2 = 653.265,1  x IR2             (13) 
TR3 = 564.576,6  x IR3             (14) 
TR4 = 360.774,6  x IR4             (15) 
TR5 = 660.308,9  x IR5             (16) 
TR6 = 1.061.351 x  IR6           (17) 
TR7 = 1.073.400   x IR7           (18) 
TR8 = 1.425.994  x IR8           (19) 
 
Of course, there are a lot of limitations derived from the small size of data 
used,  from  the  absence  of  other  explicative  variables  and  from  some 
statistical properties of the residuals errors. Despite these limitations, one 
can  conclude  that  the  model  is  able  to  enlighten  at  least  partially  the 
correlations between the political „affinity” and the value of local transfers   6 
and  to  provide  an  empirical  support  for  the  mentioned  theoretical 
framework. 
 
This survey revealed the fact that between the two elements exists a linkage 
strong enough and the interfering effects of the political on the repartition 
central public funds vary from one region to another, and this fact arise the 
problem of the justness of the repartition mechanism of the public funds to 
local authorities. The greatest distortion effects can be noticed in regions R8 
- Bucharest, R7 - Center, R6 – North - West and R1 – North - East, and we 
can assume that electorate from that regions is very flexible and sensitive on 
the aspect of given the vote to the forces that hold the power. On contrary, 
on the other regions, the electorate remains political faithful, even if the 
party or the coalition will or will not de power. We can observe in this case, 
that the „financial recompense” is equivalences. 
 
We  can  conclude  that  the  purpose  of  our  scientific  demarche  is  not  to 
propose a new “model of central public funds”, but only to reveal the fact 
the actual repartition system of public funds is not working right, mostly 




1. Arrow Kenneth, Social choice and individual values, University Press, 
Yale New Haven, 1963. 
2.  Bordignon  Massimo,  Emiliani  Nicoletta,  Manesse  Paolo,  Tabellini 
Guido, Come fare la perequazione regionale in Italia?, Working Paper, 
Universita Statale di Milano, 1997.  
3.  Buchanan  James,  Public  Choice:  The  Origins  and  Development  of  a 
Research  Program,  Center  for  Study  of  Public  Choice,  George  Mason 
University, Fairfax, Virginia, 2003. 
4. Buchanan James, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 
University of Chicago Press, 1975. 
5. Inman Robert, Rubinfeld Daniel, Fiscal federalism in Europe: lesson 
from the United States experience, Working Paper, University of California, 
Berkley, 1991. 
6. Talpoş Ioan, Mutaşcu Mihai, Dudaş Doru, Transferurile bugetare versus 
autonomia  financiară  locală  -  cazul  României,  Sesiunea  de  comunicări   7 
ştiinţifice  cu  participare  internaţională,  Lumea  financiară  -  prezent  şi 
perspective, Cluj-Napoca, 2003. 
 
 